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1 Introduction
A recent report by McKinsey and Company shows
that, in general, innovation in the chemicals indus-
try continues to generate returns well above the
cost of capital, but that a high degree of variation
exists in innovation performance.  The authors
observe that while attractive opportunity exists
within the industry, some firms fail to structure
their R&D properly (Meremadi et al., 2013).  Partic-
ularly within the chemicals industry, firms must
develop innovation processes that drive the cre-
ation of valuable scientific knowledge.
Innovative firms must do two things well.  They
must exploit their existing competencies in order
to create value for firm stakeholders.  They must
also explore for new forms of advantage so that
they can remain competitive as markets shift to
new a new paradigm, which makes prior forms of
innovation obsolete (March, 1991; 1996; 2006).  This
exploration/ exploitation tradeoff is particularly
important in R&D-intensive industries, where the
value of older forms of R&D-based innovation are
constantly eroded by competitive imitation and
newer, superior forms of innovation. 
A common view is that firms investing consistent-
ly in R&D over time to create the least amount of
disruption in their R&D labs. Consequently, they
make the steadiest progress towards valuable inno-
vations.  In fact, previous research tells us that con-
sistent, steady R&D investment is required in order
to create sustainable competitive advantage (Dier-
ckx and Cool, 1989), and that “research workers are
not perfectly elastic in supply and cannot be fired
and rehired as business conditions might warrant”
(Hambrick et al., 1983: 759).  This literature suggests
that firms change R&D expenditure for reasons
that could seriously impact progress towards inno-
vation.
However, an alternative view is possible. Firms that
invest about the same amount in R&D over time
may be suffering from organizational inertia (Han-
nan and Freeman, 1984) that prevents them from
making adjustments to the firm’s innovation
processes.  This suggestion implies that stable R&D
investments over time arise from bureaucratic inac-
tion, making timely and necessary changes to the
firm’s R&D function difficult to implement.  
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A common view is that investors view steady firm-level R&D investment as evidence
of the firm’s commitment to R&D-based innovation.  However, recent research shows
that R&D expenditure volatility is positively related to firm performance, sugges-
ting that higher levels of R&D expenditure volatility indicate effective governance
of the R&D function.  This paper shows that the relationship between R&D expen-
diture volatility and firm performance is stronger within firms that have higher levels
of information asymmetry between the firm and its investors.  This finding suggests
that investors interpret R&D expenditure volatility as a good thing, and that this
form of information takes on more significance in the absence of better sources of
evidence.  Innovative chemicals companies may reconsider conventional wisdom
suggesting that consistent R&D expenditure conveys an emphasis on R&D-based
innovation.  Instead, firms can explain to investors that significant changes in R&D
expenditure indicate that management is proactively managing R&D projects and
combating R&D overinvestment.
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In fact, research has shown that R&D expenditure
volatility can arise under many contingencies.  Some
of these contingencies are beneficial to sustained
firm performance; others are not.  Firms reduce
R&D expenditure in order to improve short-term
earnings performance (Baber et al., 1991; Dechow
and Sloan, 1991), which could erode the firm’s long-
term innovative capabilities.  Firms modify R&D
expenditure based upon the level of technological
and market uncertainty they face (Oriani and
Sobrero, 2008; Levitas and Chi, 2010).  
While narrow contingencies exist within which
changes in R&D expenditure can be harmful to
firm performance (e.g. – earnings manipulation),
recent research indicates that, in general, fluctua-
tions in firm-level R&D expending is a good thing.
R&D expenditure volatility is positively associated
with firm growth (Mudambi and Swift, 2011).  Recent-
ly, Mudambi and Swift (2013) find that higher lev-
els of compact, significant changes in R&D expen-
diture indicate that the firm is moving between
R&D-based exploration and exploitation.  Increas-
es in R&D expenditure above the firm’s historic
trend are associated with increased exploratory
R&D and the creation of highly cited patents; dra-
matic changes in R&D spending in either direction
are associated with higher firm valuations and high-
er levels of patented firm knowledge.  
Business academicians have been criticized for con-
ducting research that has little impact on real-world
issues (Bailey and Ford, 1996; Pfeffer and Fong,
2002).  Do these findings about the relationship
between R&D expenditure volatility and firm per-
formance really matter?  It is important to evalu-
ate not only the theoretical, but also the practical
significance of this emerging area of study.
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether
R&D expenditure volatility is important to investors.
If higher levels of R&D expenditure volatility indi-
cate that executive managers are proactively mon-
itoring the firm’s R&D function, then investors may
infer that this volatility is evidence that the firm is
combating R&D management entrenchment that
can lead to the decline of the firm’s competitive
advantage.  This new research on R&D expenditure
volatility can be linked to prior work on firm valu-
ation under conditions of information asymmetry
between the firm and its investors in order to glean
new insights on the meaning and importance of
R&D expenditure volatility to the investment com-
munity.
The level of information that the firm provides to
external investors is an important driver of firm
value.  Firms disclose information through a vari-
ety of means such as compulsory filings with gov-
ernment agencies, press releases, quarterly results
briefings, annual shareholders’ meetings, and pri-
vate communications with important market ana-
lysts.  Firms that provide higher levels of informa-
tion have lower levels of information asymmetry
between firm insiders and outside investors; such
firms are considered to be transparent.  This high
information disclosure increases investor confi-
dence that the firm mitigates agency problems and
generally results in higher firm valuations (Clark-
son et al., 1996; Easley and O’Hara, 2004).   
Firms that disclose less information have higher
levels of information asymmetry, and can be char-
acterized as opaque.  Opaque firms provide less
information to outside investors; this lack of infor-
mation increases the likelihood that inside investors
such as founding family members can exploit minor-
ity investors, leading to poorer firm performance
(Easley and O’Hara, 2004; Anderson et al., 2009). 
Information asymmetry is influenced by several
factors.  Prior research shows that younger firms
(Berger and Udell, 1995) and firms with higher lev-
els of R&D intensity (Aboody and Lev, 2000) are
less transparent to investors.  In other words, under
these conditions, less information is available to
outside investors; therefore it is more difficult for
firms to evaluate accurately the performance of
the firm.
Under conditions of higher information asymme-
try, investors place greater emphasis on secondary
sources of information, such as top management
team demographics (Sanders and Boivie, 2004: 168).
For example, secondary sources of information have
been found to be particularly important to firm val-
uation in firms with higher levels of R&D intensi-
ty since it is difficult for firm outsiders to observe
progress in R&D (Gu and Li, 2007).   Thus, if investors
view R&D expenditure volatility as a form of infor-
mation disclosure, then these expenditure patterns
should have a stronger influence on firm value
among firms with higher levels of information
asymmetry.  
In this paper, I show that, in general, investors con-
sider volatile R&D expenditure a good thing.  I
accomplish this task by showing that the relation-
ship between R&D expenditure volatility and firm
value is stronger when investors have relatively
less information with which to evaluate the firm.
Using financial and economic data from 3,074 pub-
licly traded manufacturing firms comprising almost
17,000 firm-year observations from 1997 to 2006,
I find that the relationship between R&D expendi-
ture volatility and firm value is stronger under con-
ditions of higher corporate opacity (i.e.:  higher
information asymmetry).  Sub-sample analysis on
observations from firms participating in the chem-
icals industry reveals similar results.  This finding
implies that when investors have relatively less
information with which to evaluate firm prospects,
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they place greater emphasis on R&D expenditure
volatility as an indication that the firm is proac-
tively managing its R&D function properly.  
This news has important practical ramifications.
Since prior research suggests that consistent, steady
R&D investment over time is the best path to cre-
ating firm value (Dierckx and Cool, 1989), firm man-
agers can be impelled to maintain consistent R&D
expenditure over time, in the hope that this steady
expenditure profile indicates to outside observers
that the firm is committed to investing patiently
in R&D, without pressing for unrealistic results.
However, if investors consider firm level R&D expen-
diture volatility as a sign of proactive R&D man-
agement, firm decision-makers may permit R&D
expenditure to fluctuate, and to communicate the
reasons for these changes to the investment com-
munity.  
2 R&D expenditure volatility and infor-
mation asymmetry: Research hypotheses
It is possible to interpret the meaning of R&D
expenditure volatility in multiple ways.  Reductions
in R&D spending have long been interpreted as
earnings manipulation, wherein firms reduce R&D
spending in order to generate short-term earnings
improvement.  Prior research has documented two
circumstances under which firms reduce their level
of R&D expenditure in a manner consistent with
this view.  R&D spending is more likely to be reduced
when the CEO approaches retirement (Dechow and
Sloan, 1991) or when the firm is likely to miss an
earnings objective (Baber et al., 1991; Perry and Gri-
nacker, 1994).  
Firms that consistently increase R&D spending
may be viewed as having volatile R&D spending.
However, firms often overinvest in R&D (Barnet
and Freeman, 2001; McMath and Forbes, 1998;
Demirel and Mazzucato, 2012).  A steady, relatively
linear increase in R&D spending may indicate R&D
overspending, wherein firms are unable to cull
underperforming R&D projects.  Conversely, firms
that persistently decrease R&D spending are like-
ly to be in significant decline (Chen and Miller, 2007).
However, firms that both increase and decrease
R&D spending over time have been shown to be
superior firms.  A broad body of findings suggest
that exploratory R&D is more expensive than
exploitative (Clark et al., 1987; Clark and Fujimoto,
1991; Dyer, 1996; DiMasi et al., 2003; Gagnon and
Lexchin, 2008; Harryson et al., 2008).  Compact, rel-
atively large increases in R&D spending are asso-
ciated with increases in exploratory R&D and the
creation of more highly cited patents (Mudambi
and Swift, 2013).  In turn, decreases are associated
with increases in exploitative R&D.  Firms with high-
er levels of overall R&D expenditure volatility exhib-
it higher levels of firm growth (Mudambi and Swift,
2011) and superior firm valuation (Swift, 2013).
Taken collectively, this new research suggests
that the best firms have the ability to proactively
manage their R&D portfolios, transitioning from
exploitative R&D to exploration once the value of
the firm’s R&D portfolio wanes, and back to exploita-
tion once the firm finds new sources of competi-
tive advantage (Mudambi and Swift, 2011; Mudambi
and Swift, 2013).  This form of R&D management,
wherein the firm moves between periods of explo-
ration and exploitation, results in a volatile R&D
expenditure pattern over time.
In addition to the well-known challenges relat-
ed to the tradeoffs between exploration and
exploitation (March, 1991; 1996; 2006), innovative
firms must deal with the problems related to infor-
mation asymmetry.  Accounting information for
R&D-intensive firms is less informative than for
low (or non) R&D firms.  Aboody and Lev (2000)
offer three reasons for this.  First, since R&D expen-
ditures are expensed immediately, the knowledge
assets created by R&D are not recorded on the firm’s
balance sheet.  Investors cannot evaluate the effec-
tiveness of the firm’s R&D investments in the short
run by observing changes in the balance sheet.  Sec-
ond, since R&D projects are unique to the develop-
ing firm, investors cannot compare one firm’s R&D
expenditures to R&D expenditure of comparable
firms.  Third, since no open market exists for R&D-
based knowledge, the market does not inform us
on the value of a particular firm’s R&D output by
assigning a price to it.  Investors do not receive guid-
ance from the market on valuing the R&D outputs
of a particular firm.  As a result, it is likely that greater
information asymmetry exists between the R&D-
intensive firm and its investors.  
Not only is information asymmetry higher
between the R&D-intensive firm and its investors,
but also greater efforts are made by R&D-inten-
sive firms to mitigate that information asymme-
try.  Tasker (1998a) shows that the number of con-
ference calls conducted with investment analysts
is higher in R&D intensive firms, and that the major-
ity of questions raised by analysts on these calls
are related to the firm’s R&D (1998b).  Higher R&D
intensity increases firm opacity, and also increas-
es the importance of the firm’s R&D function to
investors.  De facto, since R&D is a major form of
investment for R&D-intensive firms, investors place
greater emphasis on the importance of R&D spend-
ing in these firms.  
There are several drivers of the level of infor-
mation asymmetry between the firm and its
investors.  In general, research indicates that high-
er levels of R&D intensity (Tasker, 1998a; Tasker,
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1998b; Aboody and Lev, 2000) and relatively recent
initial public offerings (Burger and Udell, 1995) can
increase firm opacity.  In addition, reduced infor-
mation disclosure leads to higher information asym-
metry, and decreases firm value (Clarkson et al.,
1996; Easley and O’Hara, 2004).  
Figure one below represents my research ques-
tion.  In this paper, I evaluate whether the level of
information asymmetry between the firm and its
investors influences the relationship between R&D
expenditure volatility and firm value.
Prior research has established the positive rela-
tionship between R&D expenditure volatility and
firm performance (Mudambi and Swift 2011; 2013;
Swift, 2013) as well as the negative relationship
between information asymmetry and firm per-
formance (Easley and O’Hara, 2004).  The research
focus in this paper is on the moderating role of
information asymmetry on the relationship between
R&D expenditure volatility and firm performance.
I proceed to evaluate my research question using
two important determinants of firm opacity:  the
intangible nature of firm capabilities; and reduced
information disclosure.
2.1 R&D Expenditure Volatility and Intangible Capa-
bilities
In the preceding section, I noted that prior
research has found that higher levels of informa-
tion asymmetry decrease firm value.  However, firms
may possess intangible capabilities that can both
increase firm opacity and firm value.  For example,
R&D-based innovation is difficult for outside
investors to observe.  This type of intangible capa-
bility increases information asymmetry (Aboody
and Lev, 2000).  As a result, outside investors demand
higher investment returns in order to compensate
for the risk of this information asymmetry (Riley,
1989).  This demand for higher returns decreases
firm value by increasing the firm’s cost of capital.
Yet R&D-based innovation also creates many forms
of valuable innovation, simultaneously increasing
firm value (Hall et al., 2005).  In general, the net
direct impact of many forms of intangible capabil-
ity on firm value is positive.  The first set of hypothe-
ses test the effect that the level of firm intangible
capabilities has on the relationship between R&D
expenditure volatility and firm value.
2.2 Corporate opacity and R&D intensity
As mentioned above, the level of firm opacity
can be exacerbated within highly innovative firms,
because opacity is particularly problematic in R&D-
intensive firms (Tasker, 1998a; Tasker 1998b; Aboody
and Lev, 2000).  R&D project payoffs are difficult
to anticipate; R&D projects can persist for 10 to 12
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Figure 1 Conceptual Model.
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years without producing a rent-generating patent
(Bernardo et al., 2001).  Even if R&D projects do pay
off, the benefit to the firm may be difficult to
observe.  Many firms devote R&D investment to
creating process innovations that are not patent-
ed (Devinney, 1993) and do not produce results that
are readily observable to the investment commu-
nity.
The combined forces of higher levels of infor-
mation asymmetry and the heightened importance
of R&D spending to the firm should prompt
investors to place greater emphasis on the mean-
ing of R&D expenditure volatility.  This logic leads
to a first hypothesis.
H1: The positive relationship between R&D
expenditure volatility and firm value is stronger
among firms with higher levels of R&D inten-
sity.
2.3 R&D expenditure volatility and firm age
In general, firm age is negatively related with
firm value. Older, larger firms are less likely to search
for new knowledge and information (March, 1988;
Miller and Chen, 1996).  In addition, older firms have
more standardized procedures, which can reduce
organizational flexibility (Hannan and Freeman,
1984; Nystrom and Starbuck, 1984). Younger firms
are also smaller. Thus it is more likely that these
smaller firms can post higher percentage rates of
growth, which are likely to increase firm value
(Hayashi and Inoue, 1991; Lang et al., 1996).
Firm age is an important determinant of firm
opacity (Berger and Udell, 1995). Entrepreneurs in
smaller firms often have highly specialized skills,
and can be overwhelmed with the administrative
tasks involved with managing a complex firm
(Ciampi and Gordini, 2009). Thus management in
smaller, younger firms is less able to engage in
investor relations, which can decrease information
asymmetry.  Investors learn about firms over time.
Younger firms have had less time to inform investors
on their future prospects, to build a reputation, or
to demonstrate stable and predictable perform-
ance. Prior research shows that lenders demand
higher rates of return from young firms in initial
periods, and lower rates in subsequent periods after
lenders have learned more about firm prospects
(Boot and Thakor, 1994). Firm youth increases the
information asymmetry between the firm and the
investment community. 
Building firm-level legitimacy is a path-depend-
ent process.  By meeting performance targets and
keeping commitments, firms gain the trust of stake-
holders.  Firms cannot acquire this credibility quick-
ly; reputation is built over time. Ceteris paribus,
investors are less able to observe the firm’s R&D
function accurately within younger firms.  Thus,
investors in younger firms have less information
with which to evaluate the firm’s R&D prospects,
and should rely more on the meaning of R&D expen-
diture volatility.  These observations lead to a sec-
ond research hypothesis.
H2: The positive relationship between R&D
expenditure volatility and firm value is stronger
among younger firms.
2.4 R&D expenditure volatility and reduced infor-
mation disclosure
Innovative firms have good reason to withhold
information from its investors.  Perhaps the best
reason that firms focusing on innovation may min-
imize information available to the public is the
“Arrow paradox” (Arrow, 1962), which occurs when
firms attempt to move intellectual property across
firm boundaries.  Buyers of innovation demand
information about it in order to evaluate their pur-
chasing decision.  However, in the process of dis-
closing this information, the seller effectively trans-
fers this innovation to the buying firm without
receiving any compensation.  Thus, it pays for inno-
vative firms not to disclose too much information
about its proprietary knowledge, which drives up
information asymmetry between the firm and its
stakeholders.  
Within these opaque firms, insiders hold more
information than the investment community at
large.  Outside investors can be exploited by inside
investors that have superior information.   “This
cross-sectional effect results in the uninformed
traders always holding too much of stocks with
bad news, and too little of stocks with good news”
(Easley and O’Hara, 2004: 1554).  Two ways to meas-
ure the amount and quality of information that is
available to investors is the accuracy of investment
analyst earnings forecasts, and the bid-ask spread
on the firm’s share price.  The bid-ask spread is the
difference between the highest price that a buyer
is willing to pay for a share of firm stock and the
lowest price at which a seller will sell the share.
This difference is kept by the equity exchange spe-
cialist handling this transaction.
2.4.1 Corporate opacity and analyst earnings esti-
mates
Higher amounts of information reduce the dif-
ficulty of estimating the true value of the firm’s
assets (Clarkson et al., 1996; Easley and O’Hara,
2004). This research provides strong evidence that
more information reduces the cost of equity capi-
tal through reduced estimation risk.
One way to evaluate the information that is
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available on a firm is to observe the accuracy of
analyst earnings forecasts.  Professional invest-
ment analysts gather information on firms via pub-
lic and private sources by doing things such as scru-
tinizing the firm’s public information disclosures
and evaluating insider trades (Healy and Palepu,
2001).  The accuracy of stock analyst earnings fore-
casts are a function of the quality of information
that the firm makes available to the investment
community (Barron et al., 1998).   
Among firms with higher analyst earnings fore-
cast errors, investors have less information with
which to evaluate the firm’s prospects.  Thus,
investors place greater reliance on secondary per-
formance indicators such as R&D expenditure
volatility.  This observation leads to a third research
hypothesis:
H3a: The relationship between R&D expendi-
ture volatility and firm value is stronger among
firms with higher analyst forecast earnings error.
2.4.2 Corporate opacity and bid-ask spread
Higher levels of information asymmetry between
the firm and its investors also increase the level of
risk incurred by market markets on equity exchanges
(Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991).  When a dearth of
information exists on publicly traded firms, investors
are less able to accurately assess the true value of
the firm.  For example, prior work has found that
when the market maker perceives that the infor-
mation advantage held by informed investors has
increased, market makers increase the bid-ask
spread in order to accommodate the increased trad-
ing risk (Copeland and Galai, 1983; Glosten and Mil-
grom, 1985).  Other work shows that information
events such as earnings and dividend announce-
ments impact the bid-ask spread (Venkatesh and
Chiang, 1986).  Under conditions in which market
makers are less able to evaluate the true value of
the firm, investors place greater emphasis on the
meaning of R&D expenditure volatility.  This line
of reasoning leads to a final, complementary hypoth-
esis:
H3b:  The relationship between R&D expendi-
ture volatility and firm value is stronger among
firms with higher bid-ask spreads.
3 Research Methods
3.1  The Data
The sample frame is generated from the Compus-
tat Annual North America databases (Standard and
Poors, 2011) which provide accounting and market
information on all publicly traded firms in the U.S,
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)
database (CRSP, 2011), which provides bid and ask
prices publicly traded stocks, and from the Institu-
tional Brokers’ Estimate System, or I/B/E/S (Thom-
son-Reuters, 2011), which provides institutional ana-
lysts’ earnings forecasts over time.  I constructed
two data sets to test my hypotheses.  Since fewer
firms have an analyst following, the dataset used
to test information asymmetry is smaller than the
dataset used to test intangible assets.  In order to
test the hypotheses using information asymmetry
as measured by bid-ask spread or analyst earnings
forecast accuracy, I include only those firms that
report bid-ask spread data in CRSP, and analyst fore-
casts in I/B/E/S.
A measure of industry concentration is taken from
the U.S. Economic Census (U.S. Census Bureau, 2002).
Following Hall et al. (2005), all manufacturing firms
(NAICS codes 31 through 3399) are selected.  Each
observation represents one firm-year.  After remov-
ing observations with missing values, the data set
used to evaluate information asymmetry contains
6,373 firm-year observations.  The dataset used to
evaluate the influence of intangible firm capabili-
ties contains 17,016 firm-year observations.  Since
not all firms existed for each year of the ten year
study window selected, this is an unbalanced panel.
The average number of years reported for each firm
is 5.5 years.
This data set covers the years 1997 to 2006.  Peri-
ods of punctuated change within the punctuated
equilibrium model have been shown to be fairly
compact.  Romanelli and Tushman (1994) showed
that most firms accomplish profound change with-
in two years.  Thus, over the ten year study window
used in this paper, good chance of observing peri-
ods of punctuated change exists.  
3.2  Dependent variable 
Tobin’s q  Firm value is measured using a proxy
for Tobin’s q. Tobin’s q is defined as the ratio of the
market value of a firm to the replacement cost of
its assets. Firms with a q-ratio greater than unity
are creating economic value. Q incorporates a cap-
ital market measure of firm rents, minimizes dis-
tortions due to tax laws and accounting conven-
tions, and implicitly uses the correct risk-adjusted
discount rate (Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 1988).  
For the purposes of this analysis, Chung and
Pruitt’s (1994) simple approximation of Tobin’s q
is used.  It retains almost all of the original infor-
mativeness of the theoretically correct q ratio.  Their
approximate q implicitly assumes that the replace-
ment values of a firm’s plant, property and equip-
ment (PP&E) and inventories are equal to their book
values.  The market-value of debt is substituted by
the value of the firm’s short-term liabilities less the
Tim Swift
Journal of Business Chemistry 2014, 11 (1)© 2014 Institute of Business Administration 20
Journal of Business Chemistry 2014, 11 (1) © 2014 Institute of Business Administration 21
short-term assets plus the book value of the firm’s
long-term debt.  The authors find that at least 96.6%
of the variation in Tobin’s q is explained by the
approximate q.  
3.3 Independent variables
The following variables are included in the
regression analysis in order to evaluate the research
hypotheses offered above.
3.3.1 R&D Expenditure Volatility
R&D expenditure volatility can be an observ-
able marker for successful proactive management.
I measured it over the ten year study period as the
standard deviation of the residuals from the firm’s
R&D expenditure trend over the study period
(Mudambi and Swift, 2011; Swift, 2013).  This meas-
ures R&D volatility net of R&D expenditure growth.
The calculation is performed using a two-step
process.  First, I regress R&D expenditure on a lin-
ear time trend:  
R&D expenditure i,t= A0i + A1i t + ei,           (1)
where t ranges from one to ten (corresponding
to years 1997 to 2006) and i = firm.
Estimating this equation gives us the trend value
of R&D expenditure.  Residuals around this trend
line are calculated as the actual R&D expenditure
minus the trend value of R&D expenditure.  The
standard deviation of these residuals provides an
absolute measure of R&D expenditure volatility
for each firm.  However, this measure is increasing
in the size of R&D expenditures, so larger R&D
spenders would tend to have larger standard devi-
ations.
Therefore, in the second step, I divide the stan-
dard deviation of the residuals about the R&D time-
trend by the mean R&D expenditure over the ten
year study period:
R&D expenditure volatility = si ÷ xi (2)
where s = the standard deviation of R&D expen-
diture residuals about the time-trend, i = firm, and
x = the mean R&D expenditure over time.
This calculation provides us with a relative meas-
ure of R&D expenditure volatility that incorporates
the firm’s level of R&D spending.
3.3.2 Analyst Earnings Forecast Error
Prior research finds that analyst earnings fore-
cast accuracy is an effective measure of corporate
opacity (Barron et al., 1998).  Following Anderson
et al. (2009), analyst earnings forecast accuracy is
calculated as the difference between the mean
analyst earnings forecast and the actual earnings
for that quarter, divided by the average of the mean
analyst earnings forecast and the actual earnings
for that quarter.  For each year, I take the mean value
of analyst earnings forecast error across the four
quarters.
3.3.3 Bid-Ask Spread
As discussed above, the firm’s bid-ask spread is
another measure of corporate opacity.  I compute
the bid-ask spread as the ask price minus the bid
price divided by the average of the bid and the ask
prices. To compute a measure of the bid-ask spread,
I average all trades for each firm at month-end clos-
ing prices, and then calculate a yearly average based
on these 12 observations.
3.3.4 R&D Intensity
R&D intensity is measured as annual R&D
expenditure divided by firm sales.
3.3.5 Firm Age
The passage of time does not have a linear, or
constant, influence on firm performance over time.
The passage of one more year for a 25 year old firm
is not as significant as the passage of one more
year for a three year old firm.  An arbitrary cutoff
point of ten years of age was selected to distin-
guish younger firms from older firms.  (The results
presented in this paper are robust to selecting other
ages as cutoff points between younger and older
firms.)  Firms whose initial public offering occurred
in the most recent ten years of the study (from 1997
to 2006) are considered young firms.  If the firm’s
initial public offering occurred after 1996, a bina-
ry variable denoting firm age is set to one.  Other-
wise, the binary variable is set to zero.
3.4 Control variables
There is a broad literature providing empirical sup-
port for many different sources of influence on
Tobin’s q.  I isolate those influences before testing
my research hypothesis.  The following set of vari-
ables control for firm-specific and industry effects.
Highly concentrated industries are viewed as less
competitive; firms in such industries enjoy high
entry barriers and may appropriate economic rents
(McGahan and Porter, 1997).  Therefore, I include
the U.S. Economic Census’ measure of industry con-
centration (market share of the twenty largest firms
in each four digit NAICS industry).  Tobin’s q is gen-
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erally viewed to be an indication of the firm’s future
growth prospects (Hayashi and Inoue, 1991).  Firm
sales growth over the previous year is included to
control for this influence.  Earnings per share (net
income divided by shares outstanding) is included
to capture the effect of firm profitability on
Tobin’s q (Erickson and Whited, 2000), and the level
of firm sales is included to control for firm size
(Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988).  In addition
to being one of the study variables, R&D intensity
is also included as a control variable, since several
researchers have shown a direct relationship
between R&D intensity and firm performance (Jaffe,
1986; Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; Hall et al., 2005).
Firm value has been shown to decrease over cor-
porate diversification (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Campa
and Kedia, 2002).  An entropy index (Theil, 1967) is
used to measure firm diversification [36], which is
calculated as follows:
#ofdivisionsFirm diversification = ∑n=1                      [Pn*ln(1÷Pn)]          (3)
where Pn = percentage of firm revenues derived
by division n.  Multiple divisions that are reported
in the same six digit NAICS code are treated as one
division.
Lang, Ofek and Stulz (1996) find that firm lever-
age effects Tobin’s q.  The firm’s debt ratio (long-
term debt divided by total assets) is included to
control for the influence of leverage.  
In practice, many firms set R&D spending tar-
gets as a percentage of expected firm sales (Scher-
er, 2001; Neelankavil and Alaganar, 2003; Tubbs,
2007).  In all specifications, I include a measure of
sales volatility, which is calculated using the same
methodology as R&D expenditure volatility, in order
to control for the volatility in firm sales over time
(Mudambi and Swift, 2011; Swift, 2013).
Finally, prior literature shows that the relation-
ship between R&D expenditure volatility and firm
performance is negative among very small firms
(Mudambi and Swift, 2011; Swift, 2013).  Thus, I seek
to capture the unique effects that are attributable
to very small firms.  I include a dummy variable that
is set to one if annual firm sales are less than $10
million, or to zero if firm sales is greater than or
equal to $10 million.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the
sample data.
In order to correct for the skewed distribution
of the measure of firm value, bid-ask spread, ana-
lysts’ earnings forecast error, firm size, firm lever-
age, and R&D intensity, these variables are log-
transformed.   Note that analyst earnings forecast
accuracy and bid-ask spread are negatively corre-
lated with firm value, which is consistent with a
broad body of literature asserting that information
asymmetry is positively related to the firm’s cost
of capital (Easley and O’Hara, 2004).  However, note
that while prior literature suggests that firm level
R&D intensity is a determinant of corporate opac-
ity (Aboody and Lev, 2000) the correlation between
R&D intensity and analyst earnings forecast accu-
racy or bid ask spread is quite weak, and the corre-
lation between R&D intensity and firm value is pos-
itive.  This finding is consistent with a much broad-
er literature arguing that high performing firms
maintain a higher level of R&D intensity and con-
tinue to re-invest in their innovative capabilities
(Jaffe, 1986; Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; Hall et al.,
2005).  
Note that R&D expenditure volatility is only
weakly correlated with R&D intensity, suggesting
that R&D volatility captures a different dimension
of firm behavior than R&D intensity.  While a com-
mon view posits that R&D expenditure is set as a
fixed percentage of firm  Fosales (Scherer, 2001;
Tubbs, 2007), it is interesting to note that R&D
expenditure volatility is positively correlated to
sales volatility, but only at r = 0.40.
4.2 Primary Tests
Multiple regression analysis is used to test the
research hypothesis. In all equations, the t-values
are corrected for heteroskedasticity using estimat-
ed generalized least squares (EGLS). Dummy vari-
ables are used to estimate the fixed effect of each
year. In the specifications tested below, I regress
Tobin’s q for each firm-year on the average level of
R&D expenditure volatility observed over the study
period for each firm (Mudambi and Swift, 2011;
Swift, 2013). I take this approach because prior
research shows that Tobin’s q is quite sticky. That
is, q moves sluggishly over time, and is heavily influ-
enced by the firm’s prior performance (Lang et al.,
1989). In this analysis, I evaluate whether R&D
expenditure volatility is related to sustained firm
performance over the study period.  
Table 2 shows the results of the regression analy-
ses used to evaluate Hypotheses 1 and 2.
Hypothesis 1 states that the relationship
between R&D expenditure volatility and firm value
is stronger among firms with higher levels of R&D
intensity. Column one shows the regression equa-
tion estimates using control variables only. Column
two shows the regression estimates including the
measure of R&D expenditure volatility. Note that
the explanatory power of the specification using
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Table 1 Summary Statistics.
only control variables shown in column one is sta-
tistically significant, based on its F-ratio. An incre-
mental F-test shows that the explanatory power
of the specification shown in column two is statis-
tically significantly greater than the controls-only
model shown in column one. The parameter esti-
mate on R&D expenditure volatility is positive and
statistically significant. This observation is consis-
tent with prior research showing that R&D expen-
diture volatility is positively related to firm per-
formance (Mudambi and Swift, 2011; Mudambi and
Swift, 2013; Swift, 2013). 
Column three includes the interaction of R&D
expenditure volatility and R&D intensity. Note that
the parameter estimates on R&D expenditure
volatility, R&D intensity and the interaction of R&D
volatility and R&D intensity are all positive and sta-
tistically significant. In addition, the incremental
F-test indicates that the explanatory power of this
specification is statistically significantly greater
than the R&D volatility only specification shown
in column two. While R&D intensity can increase
corporate opacity, the positive parameter estimate
is consistent with research indicating that R&D
intensity increases firm value (Jaffe, 1986; Hall et
al., 2005). Using R&D intensity as a measure of the
intangible value of the firm, Hypothesis 1 is sup-
ported.
Hypothesis 2 states that the relationship
between R&D expenditure volatility and firm value
is stronger among younger firms. The results of this
test are shown in Table 2. Column four includes the
measures of R&D expenditure volatility, a young
firm indicator, and the interaction of the young firm
indicator and R&D expenditure volatility. An incre-
mental F-test indicates that the explanatory power
of this specification is statistically significantly
greater than the R&D volatility only specification
shown in column two. The parameter estimate on
R&D expenditure is once again positive and statis-
tically significant. The parameter estimate on the
young firm variable is positive and statistically sig-
nificant. Although younger firms are generally more
opaque, ceteris paribus they are also more valu-
able than older firms (Anderson et al., 2009). Thus
the positive coefficient estimate on firm age is con-
sistent with previous literature.  
The interaction of R&D volatility and the young
firm indicator is positive and statistically signifi-
cant. Among younger firms, the relationship
between R&D expenditure volatility and firm value
is more positive. Using firm age as a measure of
the intangible nature of the firm, Hypothesis 2 is
supported.
Table 3 shows the results of the regression analy-
ses used to evaluate Hypotheses 3A and 3B.  I use
a smaller dataset to evaluate these hypotheses,
since not all firms are followed by investment ana-
lysts. In tests results presented Table 3 include only
those firms that have an analyst following, and
report bid-ask spreads in CRSP.
Hypothesis 3A states that the relationship
between R&D expenditure volatility and firm value
increases as analysts’ earnings forecast errors
increase. Column one presents the controls only
specification using this smaller dataset. Column
two presents the specification including the meas-
ure of R&D expenditure volatility. Once again, note
that there is a statistically significant, positive rela-
tionship between R&D expenditure volatility and
firm value, which is consistent with prior research
(Mudambi and Swift, 2011; Mudambi and Swift,
2013; Swift, 2013). Column three includes the meas-
ures of R&D expenditure volatility, analysts’ earn-
ings forecast error and the interaction of analysts’
earnings forecast error and R&D expenditure volatil-
ity. An incremental F-test indicates that the explana-
tory power of this specification is statistically sig-
nificantly greater than the R&D volatility only spec-
ification shown in column two. The parameter esti-
mate on R&D expenditure is once again positive
and statistically significant. The parameter esti-
mate on analysts’ earnings forecast error is nega-
tive and statistically significant, which is consis-
tent with prior literature establishing a negative
relationship between analyst forecast accuracy and
firm value (Clarkson et al., 1996; Easley and O’Hara,
2004). The interaction of R&D volatility and ana-
lysts’ earnings forecast error is positive and statis-
tically significant. As analysts’ earnings forecast
error increases, the relationship between R&D
expenditure volatility and firm value increases.
Hypothesis 3A is supported.
Hypothesis 3B states that the relationship
between R&D expenditure volatility and firm value
increases as bid-ask spreads increase. Column four
of Table 3 includes the measures of R&D expendi-
ture volatility, bid-ask spread and the interaction
of bid-ask spread and R&D expenditure volatility.
An incremental F-test indicates that the explana-
tory power of this specification is statistically sig-
nificantly greater than the R&D volatility only spec-
ification shown in column two. The parameter esti-
mate on R&D expenditure is positive and statisti-
cally significant. The parameter estimate on bid-ask
spread is negative and statistically significant, which
is consistent with prior literature establishing a
negative relationship between bid-ask spread and
firm value (Copeland and Galai, 1983; Glosten and
Milgrom, 1095; Venkatesh and Chiang, 1986; Dia-
mond and Verrecchia, 1991). The interaction of R&D
volatility and bid-ask spread is positive and statis-
tically significant.  As the bid-ask spread increases,
the relationship between R&D expenditure volatil-
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Table 2 R&D Volatility and Intangible Assets.
(1) Base Model (2) including R&DExpenditure Volatility
(3) including R&D
Intensity
(4) including Firm
Age
Intercept
-043 *** -046 *** -0.36 *** -0.46 ***
-11.75 -12.35 -9.12 -12.18
R&D Expenditure
Volatility 
0.16 *** 0.11 *** 0.10 ***
4.47 2.90 2.65
R&D Volatility *
R&D Intensity
0.14 ***
3.12
R&D Volatility *
Firm Age
0.28 ***
3.82
Firm R&D Intensity
0.11 *** 0.12 *** 0.07 *** 0.10 ***
7.26 7.97 3.12 6.88
Firm Age
0.07 **
2.43
Corporate 
Diversification
-0.25 *** -0.26 *** -0.24 *** -0.25 ***
-12.01 -12.26 -11.78 -12.22
Sales Volatility
0.70 *** 0.62 *** 0.61 *** 0.66 ***
18.05 15.07 14.99 16.18
Firm Profitability
0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 ***
3.31 3.26 3.14 3.20
Firm Size
0.02 *** 0.03 *** 0.02 *** 0.02 ***
5.09 5.90 4.68 5.45
Firm Debt-Ratio
0.49 *** 0.50 *** 0.54 *** 0.53 ***
12.93 13.35 14.91 14.76
Firm Growth
0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 ***
2.42 2.69 2.76 2.74
Dummy 
(if Sales < 10)
0.62 *** 0.62 *** 0.62 *** 0.59 ***
20.31 20.14 20.05 19.27
Industry 
Concentration
0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 ***
7.37 7.08 7.70 7.24
R-Square 0.163 0.165 0.170 0.172
F-Statistic 197.80 186.77 *** 174.34 *** 176.17 ***
Incremental F test 2.39 ** 5.62 *** 6.77 ***
n=17218 n=17016 n=17016 n=17016
*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10; Note: Equations are estimated with dummy variables for each year.
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These estimates show the impact that information asymmetry has on the relationship between R&D volatility and firm perfor-
mance. t-statistics in italics below parameter estimates.
ity and firm value increases.  Hypothesis 3B is sup-
ported.
Using four very different measures of informa-
tion asymmetry (or corporate opacity), I find suffi-
cient evidence supporting my main research hypoth-
esis.
4.3 Sub-Sample Analysis: Using Chemicals Firms
Only
Of particular interest to our readers is the chem-
icals industry, which is a subset of the sample of all
manufacturing firms used to test the hypotheses
above. Table 4 below presents the results of our
regression analysis using only the observations
from chemicals firms (NAICS 325). 
Column one of Table 4 shows the results using
R&D intensity as the measure of firm-level intan-
gible capabilities, and column two of Table 4 shows
the results using firm age as the measure. Column
three of Table 4 shows the results of the specifica-
tion using analyst earnings forecast accuracy as
the measure of information asymmetry. Column
four shows the results using bid-ask spread as the
measure of information asymmetry. Note that the
cross terms of R&D expenditure volatility and the
measures of intangible capabilities or information
asymmetry are positive and statistically significant
in three of the four specifications. Using a sub-sam-
ple of firms from the chemicals industry, the spec-
ification using analyst earnings forecast accuracy
is no longer statistically significant. However, the
main results are supported in the chemicals indus-
try by using bid-ask spread, R&D intensity and firm
age as measures of information asymmetry and
firm-level intangible capabilities.
These results strongly suggest that the main
findings observed across all manufacturing indus-
tries also hold in the chemicals industry in partic-
ular.  The importance of R&D expenditure volatili-
ty to investors increases as information asymme-
try between the firm and its investors increases.
5 Discussion
If a highly volatile R&D expenditure profile is a
reasonable indicator of proactive R&D manage-
ment, the findings in this paper have important
ramifications. Outside investors may interpret
volatile R&D expenditures as evidence of effective
governance of the R&D function. Since prior research
shows that investors place greater emphasis on
secondary sources information when relatively lit-
tle investor information is available (Sanders and
Boivie, 2004: 168), such cues may be particularly
valuable to investors that are evaluating opaque
firms.  
Changes to R&D expenditure are commonly
viewed as evidence of myopic decision-making by
management. R&D spending is more likely to be
reduced when the CEO approaches retirement
(Dechow and Sloan, 1991) or when the firm is like-
ly to miss an earnings objective (Baber et al., 1991).
Firm managers may consider steady R&D expen-
diture overtime as a demonstration of their com-
mitment to the innovation process. Evidence pre-
sented in this paper suggests that would be a mis-
take.
I began this paper by pointing to new research
that has identified a positive link between R&D
expenditure volatility and firm performance, not-
ing that this finding is in contrast to prior research
suggesting that stable R&D investments may be
more beneficial to firm innovation (Mudambi and
Swift, 2011; Mudambi and Swift, 2013; Swift, 2013).
I discussed the detrimental effects of corporate
opacity, and the research suggesting that under
conditions of information asymmetry, investors
place greater reliance on secondary sources of infor-
mation such as corporate governance processes in
order to evaluate the firm’s prospects. I suggest
that R&D expenditure volatility is a form of infor-
mation disclosure, and that investors place greater
emphasis on this type of secondary information
under conditions of higher information asymme-
try.  I identify four determinants of corporate opac-
ity that are particularly relevant to firm investors:
the firm’s level of R&D intensity; the age of the
firm; the accuracy of investment analyst earnings
forecasts; and the bid-ask spread. 
The first finding of this paper is the relationship
between R&D expenditure volatility and firm value
is higher among firms with higher levels of R&D
intensity. Two likely reasons for this relationship
exist.  First, since R&D projects are so difficult to
evaluate by outsiders (Bernardo et al., 2001; Stein,
2003), and the accounting and market information
on R&D is so incomplete (Aboody and Lev, 2000),
investors place greater evidence on secondary indi-
cators of R&D prospects, such as R&D expenditure
volatility. Second, since the importance of R&D to
the firm’s value increases with its R&D intensity
(Tasker, 1998a; 1998b), it follows that investors
would place greater evidence on any disclosure
that is useful in evaluating the firm’s R&D prospects.
R&D expenditure volatility takes on greater impor-
tance to investors as a form of information disclo-
sure among more R&D intensive firms. 
The second finding of this paper is that the rela-
tionship between R&D expenditure volatility and
firm value is stronger in firms that are less than
ten years from their initial public offering (IPO).
Since relatively younger firms have been observed
for relatively less time than older firms, investors
Tim Swift
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(1) Base Model (2) including R&DExpenditure Volatility
(3) including Analyst
Earnings Forecast
Accuracy
(4) including Bid-
Ask Spread
Intercept
0.11 ** 0.03 0.25 *** -1..12 ***
1.97 0.44 4.32 -14.89
R&D Expenditure
Volatility 
0.26 *** 0.15 ** 0.43 ***
4.58 2.14 2.44
R&D Volatility *
Analyst Earnings
Forecast Eror
0.43 **
3.23
R&D Volatility *
Bid-Ask Spread
0.06 **
1.99
Analyst Earnings
Forecast Error
-0.51 ***
-13.15
Bid-Ask Spread -0.44 ***-30.20
Firm R&D Intensi-
ty
0.12 *** 0.13 *** 0.06 ** -0.05 **
4.07 4.42 2.28 -1.97
Corporate 
Diversification
-0.28 *** -0.31 *** -0.32 *** -0.22 ***
-10.40 -11.05 -11.52 -8.21
Sales Volatility 0.26 *** 0.14 *** 0.14 ** -0.07 ***4.16 2.18 2.03 -1.15
Firm Profitability 0.05 *** 0.04 *** 0.02 *** 0.02 ***8.73 7.44 3.12 4.16
Firm Size 0.00 *** 0.01 *** 0.00 *** -0.12 ***0.67 1.32 -0.17 -15.19
Firm Debt-Ratio -0.06 *** -0.04 -0.02 0.15 ***-0.77 -0.56 -0.33 2.18
Firm Growth 0.03 *** 0.03 *** 0.03 *** 0.02 ***5.27 5.49 5.31 4.55
Dummy 
(if Sales < 10)
0.27 *** 0.30 *** 0.28 *** 0.44 ***
4.15 4.55 4.31 7.18
Industry 
Concentration
0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 ***
2.80 3.51 4.86 5.87
R-Square 0.090 0.095 0.130 0.238
F-Statistic 35.17 34.91 *** 45.52 *** 94.65 ***
Incremental F test 1.66 ** 11.78 *** 11.78 ***
n=6542 n=6373 n=6373 n=6373
*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10
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Table 3 R&D Volatility and Information Asymmetry.
These estimates show the impact that information asymmetry has on the relationship between R&D volatility
and firm performance.  t-statistics in italics below parameter estimates.
have more difficulty in evaluating the true prospects
of their R&D efforts. Under these conditions,
investors place greater emphasis on secondary
sources of information. Note that R&D expendi-
ture volatility has a stronger, positive influence on
firm value among younger firms.
The third finding of this paper is that informa-
tion asymmetry between the firm and its investors
increases, the relationship between R&D expendi-
ture volatility and firm value increases. Using the
most comprehensive measure of corporate opac-
ity, analyst earnings forecast error, I find that the
relationship between R&D expenditure volatility
and firm value is stronger among more opaque
firms. This finding provides further evidence that
R&D expenditure volatility is a real form of infor-
mation disclosure to outside investors, and that
investors regard this observation as a positive indi-
cation that the firm is proactively managing its
R&D function.
The final finding supports the third. Using an
alternative measure of information asymmetry,
the bid-ask spread on share prices on publicly trad-
ed exchanges, I find results that are consistent with
results using analyst earnings forecast error.
Hypothesis 3 is robust to multiple measures of infor-
mation asymmetry.  
These results are economically as well as sta-
tistically significant. For example, at the mean value
for all variables in the sample, a 10% increase in
R&D expenditure volatility results in a 1.6% increase
in firm value as measured by Tobin’s q. This rela-
tionship between R&D expenditure volatility and
firm performance is sensitive to the level of infor-
mation asymmetry between the firm and its
investors.  For example, if analyst earnings forecast
error increases by 10% above the mean value, then
a 10% increase in R&D expenditure volatility results
in a 1.8% increase in firm value. Clearly, understand-
ing the value assigned by investors to proactive
R&D management under conditions of informa-
tion asymmetry is significant.
Many of the findings in this paper are consis-
tent with previous research. The evidence present-
ed here showing that R&D intensity (Jaffe, 1986;
Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; Hall et al., 2005), firm
youth (Anderson et al., 2009) and R&D expendi-
ture volatility (Mudambi and Swift, 2011; Mudambi
and Swift, 2013; Swift, 2013) are positively related
to firm value reinforces earlier findings. The nega-
tive parameter estimate on analyst earnings fore-
cast accuracy supports earlier findings that corpo-
rate opacity results in higher cost of capital (Clark-
son et al., 1996; Easley and O’Hara, 2004). In the
same way, the negative parameter estimate on bid-
ask spread is also in line with prior research
(Copeland and Galai, 1983; Glosten and Milgrom,
1985; Venkatesh and Chiang, 1986; Diamond and
Verrecchia, 1991).
What are noteworthy in my empirical results
are the interaction terms; the parameter estimates
on the product of R&D expenditure volatility and
corporate opacity are always positive.  Using four
different measures of corporate opacity, I present
extensive evidence that R&D expenditure volatil-
ity is a form of information disclosure, and that this
disclosure is more valuable when investors are
struggling to understand the true prospects of
future firm value.
These findings can change the way we manage
R&D intensive firms, or evaluate them as investors.
This study introduces a new concept to investors,
researchers, R&D managers and investor relations
experts.  The current emphasis on the level of R&D
spending is incomplete.
While much research in R&D suggest that
smooth R&D spending over time indicates a firm’s
commitment to innovation (Grabowski, 1968; Ham-
brick et al., 1983; Dierckx and Cool, 1989), others pro-
vide evidence that firms can overinvest in R&D.
Barnett and Freeman (2001) find that firms issue
too many new products, which significantly increas-
es the likelihood of organizational failure.  McMath
and Forbes (1998) show that most new products
fail. Demirel and Mazzucato (2012) show that R&D
can dampen firm growth among large pharmaceu-
tical firms.  I suggest that R&D expenditure volatil-
ity is a valuable clue to investors that the firm is
proactively managing its R&D function, prevent-
ing R&D overinvestment during periods of R&D
based exploitation, and aggressively ramping up
exploratory R&D spending once the value of the
firm’s extant competitive advantage has eroded.  
R&D managers must monitor the firm’s future
R&D prospects aggressively. As the value of firm’s
current core competencies begin to wane, man-
agement has the opportunity to dramatically shift
R&D resources from exploitation (innovation relat-
ed to the firm’s current knowledge base) to explo-
ration (searching for new knowledge relatively dis-
tant from the firm’s existing knowledge base). Such
movements from exploration and exploitation
based R&D activities may result in a volatile R&D
expenditure over time (Mudambi and Swift, 2011;
Mudambi and Swift, 2013). In this paper, I assert
that rather than seeking smooth, consistent R&D
spending over time, firms may wish to promote
R&D spending changes, and to ensure that the
firm’s stakeholders understand the reasons for
these fluctuations.  By increasing efforts to explain
why the firm has significantly changes its level of
R&D expenditure, managers may mitigate the mar-
ket’s propensity to underestimate the true value
of the firm in the presence of information asym-
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Table 4 Chemicals Industry Results
(1) including R&D
Intensity (2) including Firm Age
(3) including Analyst
Earnings Forecast
Accuracy
(4) including Bid-
Ask Spread
Intercept
0.25 *** 0.16 ** 0.80 *** -0.12
3.48 2.46 7.91 -0.90
R&D Expenditure
Volatility 
0.12 * 0.14 ** 0.12 0.52 **
1.85 2.29 1.12 2.12
R&D Volatility *
R&D Intensity
0.16 ***
2.90
R&D Volatility *
Firm Age
0.37 ***
2.61
R&D Volatility *
Analyst Earnings
Forecast Error
0.16
0.57
R&D Volatility *
Bid-Ask Spread
0.07 *
1.79
Firm R&D Intensi-
ty
-0.01 0.05 *** -0.01 -0.08 **
-0.43 2.78 -0.31 -2.50
Firm Age -0.05 ***-0.84
Analyst Earnings
Forecast Error
-0.30 ***
-2.73
Bid-Ask Spread -0.28 ***-10.51
Corporate 
Diversification
-0.41 *** -0.41 *** -0.46 *** -0.35 ***
-8.29 -8.56 -7.54 -5.80
Sales Volatility 0.34 *** 0.38 *** 0.16 ** 0.07
5.92 6.53 2.02 0.96
Firm Profitability
0.000003 *** 0.000003 *** 0.01 -0.003
14.55 14.48 0.55 -0.21
Firm Size
0.04 *** 0.04 *** 0.01 -0.05 ***
4.12 5.11 0.77 -3.14
Firm Debt-Ratio
0.42 *** 0.43 *** -0.16 -0.31 **
5.84 5.86 -1.37 -2.55
Firm Growth 0.00 ** 0.00 ** 0.01 ** 0.01 **2.14 2.19 2.57 2.14
Dummy 
(if Sales < 10)
0.46 *** 0.45 *** 0.05 0.20 ***
8.81 8.75 0.62 2.63
R-Square 0.170 0.184 0.126 0.205
F-Statistic 174.34 *** 47.05 *** 10.72 18.28 ***
n = 3,993 n = 3,993 n = 1,442 n = 1,442
*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10; Note: Equations are estimated with dummy variables for each year.
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These following estimates show the impact that information asymmetry has on the relationship between 
R&D volatility and firm performance in the chemicals industry. t-statistics in italics below parameter estimates.
metry (Izquierdo and Izquierdo, 2007 ).
Investors in R&D intensive firms can use R&D
expenditure volatility as an important cue that
prompts focused investigation. In certain situa-
tions, fluctuations in R&D spending indicate that
the firm is manipulating earnings (Dechow and
Sloan, 1991; Baber et al., 1991). Yet in general, this
observed volatility can be evidence that the firm
transitions to exploratory R&D activities during
periods of extreme industry change that calls for
new forms of innovation (Mudambi and Swift, 2011;
Mudambi and Swift, 2013). Investors that observe
high levels of R&D expenditure volatility may wish
to undertake focused investigation into the firm’s
activities that may shed light on the sources, and
ramifications, of this observed R&D volatility.
Despite the compelling evidence presented here,
much work can be done to address gaps in this
research. This nascent line of inquiry presents new
and important questions. Future research in finance
and accounting can determine how to differenti-
ate between firms using R&D spending as a sim-
ply a buffer with which to manage short-term earn-
ings and firms that are moving between modes of
R&D-based exploration and exploitation. More
work can be done exploring the role that bound-
ary spanners play in brokering the difficult discus-
sions that must occur between the professional
guilds of management and science as R&D budg-
ets are adjusted (Mudambi and Swift, 2009). Man-
agement scholars can employ case study methods
that identify the tactics that high performing com-
panies use to determine when and how R&D expen-
diture spending should be changed as market con-
ditions warrant. Prior research has found that R&D
expenditure volatility can be detrimental in small
firms, firms competing in slow clockspeed indus-
tries, or highly diversified firms (Mudambi and Swift,
2011), yet very valuable among firms with higher
levels of organizational slack (Swift, 2013). Research
in multiple disciplines can identify other variables
that enhance or mitigate the relationship between
R&D volatility and firm value.
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